space club membership and how the club has evolved according to the maturing capabilities of Earth’s burgeoning space powers. This understanding of the space club is a useful concept for ongoing scholarship on the theorization of space power and prestige in IR.

The book’s main focus is a comparative analysis of the space histories of second-rank powers, which are grouped in three pairs: Britain and France, Canada and Australia, and finally Israel and India. Despite these states facing many grand strategic similarities, their ambitions in space have diverged, with some desperate to join the club and others content to continue to remain dependent on larger space powers. The justifications for selecting these examples are adequate, but China’s and Japan’s rather reduced presence in later chapters is a missed opportunity. Nevertheless, these comparative space histories provide an accessible and meaningful analysis of the selected states’ space efforts through the Cold War, and some in the post-Cold War era. The section on Israeli space history is a particular highlight and demonstrates the author’s command of detail and narrative. The book culminates with a short review of recent activities of ‘New Space’ companies and new state actors in space, as well as with speculation on the possible futures of the space club.

The three cases of Iran, North Korea and South Korea are fascinating from the perspective of the space club. Only the third country successfully joined, while the first two were rejected. The analysis of these cases seems somewhat short given its importance in showing the exclusionary dynamics of the space club at work. Moreover, the author could have considered how the space club fits into the English School’s ideas of social institutions in international society. However, these omissions do not undermine the book in any significant way.

Paikowsky has made an excellent foray into the theorization of astropolitical prestige in international relations. As such, this book does not overturn established (largely US) histories of space, but Paikowsky should be commended for demonstrating just how multilateral the space age has been, from its earliest years. This book is a welcome addition to the nascent field of astropolitics in IR, and demonstrates that astropolitics is the continuation of terran politics by other means.

Bleddyn E. Bowen, University of Leicester, UK

Europe


Despite the title of his book, the story Ashoka Mody tells in Eurotragedy is as much a mystery as a tragedy. He argues that there is nothing surprising about the problems that the European single currency has created. It was always going to produce divergence and increase conflict between its members—as economists like Nicholas Kaldor argued as early as 1971. ‘Rather than bringing Europeans together’, Mody writes, ‘a single currency would divide Europeans’ (p. 8). Thus, one of the questions that the book seeks to answer is why, given the obvious dangers and limited benefits, did Europeans go ahead anyway.

Mody’s book is one of the most coherent histories of the euro, starting at its origins in the minds of European leaders like Georges Pompidou and ending with the crisis that began in 2010. But perhaps the most important contribution Mody makes is his critique of the ‘pro-European’ ideology that was used to justify the euro’s creation. It was this ideology—which Mody calls groupthink—that blinded European leaders to the way that the single currency would actually undermine rather than strengthen the wider European project.
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By the mid-1960s, Mody argues, European integration had essentially fulfilled its objectives—helping European nation-states to recover from the Second World War and preventing another conflict. Moreover, a consensus was then emerging in favour of greater exchange rate flexibility. However, French leaders saw fixing exchange rates and ultimately creating a single currency as a way to re-establish ‘greater equality with an ascendant [West] Germany’ (p. 5). A series of West German chancellors played along as a way to help them reach their own political objectives.

It was out of this dynamic between France and West Germany that ‘pro-European’ ideology emerged. Central to it was the idea that European integration must continue indefinitely and that almost any problems with any step in European integration would inexorably be solved by further integration. It drew on Jean Monnet’s famous dictum that ‘Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises’. By simply ignoring the possibility that the sum could be negative, this crystallized into what Mody calls the ‘falling forward thesis’.

The embodiment of this ‘pro-European’ ideology was Helmut Kohl—the decisive figure in the story Mody tells. ‘More than anyone else, he drilled into the European psyche the idea that the single European currency was an instrument for peace’, Mody writes (p. 10)—even as others, such as the American economist Martin Feldstein, argued it was actually likely to cause rather than prevent conflict between European nation-states.

The breakthrough that led to the creation of the euro took place against the background of the negotiations on German reunification. After Kohl unilaterally announced his ten-point plan in November 1989, French President François Mitterrand darkly warned German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher that if Germany did not agree to move ahead with economic and monetary union, ‘we will return to the world of 1913’. At the Strasbourg summit the following month, Kohl agreed to convene an intergovernmental conference by the end of 1990. However, whether or not political realities forced Kohl to give in to Mitterrand at the end of 1989, Mody shows that Kohl had multiple opportunities to stop or at least slow the process later on. Kohl himself later said that he chose not to take these opportunities—apparently because he believed his own rhetoric. Kohl saw the euro through to its creation on 1 January 1999—two months later he was finally voted out of office.

Since the euro crisis began in 2010, there has been much criticism of German economic orthodoxy with its myopic focus on price stability and fiscal rules that constitutionalize austerity. But Mody’s account shows that what makes Germany’s role in the story of the euro so problematic is more complex. The Deutsche Bundesbank and the finance ministry opposed plans for an ‘incomplete’ monetary union—rightly, Mody argues—but were overruled by Kohl at the critical moment. In other words, what was disastrous for the euro was not so much German economic orthodoxy itself as its interaction with the ‘pro-European’ ideology embodied by Kohl. The result was that the euro went ahead, but with a ‘hyper-independent’ (p. 160)—that is, unaccountable—central bank with a narrow commitment to price stability and counterproductive fiscal rules. By 2010, Mody shows, these were central to the eurozone’s identity and shaped its disastrous response to the crisis.

There is no easy way out of the situation in which the EU now finds itself. But perhaps the most important message from Mody’s book is about the need for a redefinition of the concept of ‘pro-Europeanism’, which has ossified into ritualized support for integration even where it has clearly worsened tensions between Europeans. A precondition for saving the European project may be a widening of the idea of ‘pro-Europeanism’ to include alternative visions.

Hans Kundnani, Chatham House, UK

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